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INTRODUCTION
In 1904, St. Louis, Missouri was the place to go. In conjunction with its
spectacular world's fair, the city also hosted the Universal Congress of
Lawyers and Jurists, known in academic circles as the foundational event of
American comparative law.1 Within a big screen entirely devoted to the
Lochner2 centennial, this comment aims at opening a window on another
centennial - the hundredth anniversary of comparative law in the United
States.
Though inspired by the Universal Congress, this comment does not partake
in the celebratory spirit of anniversaries.3 Far from espousing a romanticized
* Associate Professor, Boston University School of Law. Special thanks to Prof. Pnina
Lahav and also to Stephen Rickard for research assistance.
I See David S. Clark, Nothing New in 2000? Comparative Law in 1900 and Today, 75
TuL. L. REV. 871, 888-92 (2001) (observing that Universal Congress "emphasized courts,
procedures, and practical lawyering with some discussion of legal harmonization").
2 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
3 It is indeed remarkable that Justice Harlan engaged in a survey of foreign labor
practices, and used them to argue that the New York statute challenged by Lochner was not
at all extravagant in its regulatory reach. Id. at 71 (listing daily workday averages in several
European countries). It is also remarkable that contemporary U.S. courts occasionally look
at European case law before deciding politically salient issues. See, e.g., Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (considering a Northern Ireland
case and its parallels to the Lawrence case). But there is nothing intrinsically comforting or
legitimizing in the occasional convergence of judicial practices, and divergence is by no
means a per se evil. U.S.-E.U. comparisons, in particular, may suffer from entrenched
Western biases likely to be reinforced by the practice of transatlantic dialogue. See David
Kennedy, The Methods and Politics of Comparative Law, in THE COMMON CORE OF
EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW 131, 200-201 (Mauro Bussani & Ugo Mattei eds., 2003)
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or universalist conception of comparative law, these pages simply stem from
the belief that foreign perspectives may help revisit conventional wisdom, and
occasionally reveal blind spots in one's vision.
I. COMPARATIVE GAPS
Before commenting on Professor Whittington's contribution to this
conference, 4 it is essential to establish a few points of congruence between the
U.S. treatment of Lochner and the contemporary sensitivity of European
jurists. At first, this may seem a daunting task. In the U.S., Lochner still
haunts contemporary jurists.5 Some treat it as a metaphor of error.6 Others
consider it a form of misapplied wisdom and point out that momentous
accelerations of constitutional history can still happen in the name of
substantive due process. 7 The ultimate challenge for these jurists is to save the
baby in the Lochner bath water. 8 In one way or another, Lochner is a legacy
that still begs coming to terms with, and as such enjoys undying popularity in
U.S. legal discourse. By contrast, scholars who have recently tackled the
Lochner theme in light of EU constitutionalism have noticed that there is very
little overlap between the two.9 In the perspective of a typical European jurist,
Lochner would likely be dismissed as old news, bad news, and news that does
(observing that "[the practice of] distinguishing regimes in loose cultural 'families' and
economic 'stages' of development [may] reinforce elite notions about cultural affinities and
differences in ways which affect policy making."). For a comprehensive critique of
comparative law projects aimed at producing "legal truth" by international exchange of
discoveries and opinions see Ruti Teitel, Comparative Constitutional Law in a Global Age,
117 HARV. L. REv. 2570, 2574-75 (2004) (book review).
4 Keith E. Whittington, Congress Before the Lochner Court, 85 B.U. L. REv. 821 (2005).
1 See, e.g., Molly S. McUsic, The Ghost of Lochner: Modern Takings Doctrine and Its
Impact on Economic Legislation, 76 B.U. L. REv. 605 (1996) (discussing how "those
opposed to the Court's [takings] direction season their arguments with charges of a return to
Lochner, while most defenders of the new takings jurisprudence take pains to draw
distinctions with Lochner")..
6 See, e.g., Patricia A. Carlson, Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia: The Lochnerization
of Affirmative Action, 27 ST. MARY'S L.J. 423, 445-47 (1996) ("The majority's decision in
Adarand harkens back to an era that many had thought long gone - the Lochner era.").
7 See John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE
L.J. 920, 941 (1973) (finding that Lochner established a rational basis test but misapplied
the analysis).
8 See, e.g., David A. Strauss, Why was Lochner Wrong?, 70 U. CHi. L. REv. 373, 375
(2003) (criticizing the Lochner court not for simply valuing freedom to contract as a
"plausible constitutional right" but for making the right "a preeminent constitutional value
that repeatedly prevails over legislation that, in the eyes of elected representatives, serves
important social purposes").
9 See, e.g., Michael R. Antinori, Note, Does Lochner Live in Luxembourg?: An Analysis
of the Property Rights Jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice, 18 FORDHAM INT'L
L.J. 1778, 1780-82 (1995).
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not belong in the old Continent.
This seemingly unbridgeable distance stems primarily from technical
difficulties. There is a remarkable time lag between the judicial review of the
Lochner era and the practice of centralized scrutiny of states' statutes in
contemporary Europe. Adequate comparisons between mature and incipient
federalism are per se improbable.' 0 Scholars' reluctance to technical
generalizations prevents Lochner from attracting more interest in European
circles.
Even more problematic is the diffuse sense of an insurmountable ideological
chasm between the Lochner court and contemporary federal or supranational
courts in Europe. If Lochner "elevated individual rights at the expense of
popular sovereignty" and of publicly conceived common goods," in no way
can the Lochner Court find a match in the constitutional discourse of
contemporary Europe. In the early 1950s, the German federal constitutional
court made it clear that the Basic Law did not guarantee absolute economic
freedom. 12 The experience of post-World War II Germany is commonly
10 See Mark Tushnet, Conclusion to COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL FEDERALISM:
EUROPE AND AMERICA 139 (Mark Tushnet ed., 1990). Technically speaking, the European
Union is not even a federation, but rather a sui generis "multi-level system of governance."
See Christian Joerges, The Challenges of Europeanization in the Realm of Private Law: A
Plea for a New Legal Discipline, 14 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 149, 190, 191 (2004). The
term "supranationalism" still describes accurately the member states' partial transfer of
sovereignty to the EU, and their subjection to centralized lawmaking in Brussels and to the
authority of the European Court of Justice in Luxembourg. See generally Joseph H.H.
Weiler, The Community System: The Dual Character of Supranationalism, 1 YEARBOOK OF
EUROPEAN LAW 268 (1981) ("[L]ike all 'federal models,' the Community presents a tension
between the whole and the parts, centrifugal and centripetal forces, central Community and
Member States.").
11 Antinori, supra note 9, at 1978-79 ("[C]onstitutional property rights were the guise
under which judicial officers usurped the powers of legislative majorities and implemented
their policy preferences into the economy.").
12 4 BVerfGE 7 (1954); see also WALTER F. MURPHY & JOSEPH TANENHAUS,
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND COMMENTARIES 278 (1977). The German
federal constitutional court had to address the plaintiffs' argument that state aids granted to
selected firms violated the constitutional principle of neutrality in economic policy, as well
as the customary economic and social order. The court explained that
the 'constituent power' has not adopted a specific economic system. This absence
enables the legislator to pursue economic policies deemed proper for the
circumstances, provided the Basic Law is observed.... Although the present economic
and social order is ... congruent with the Basic Law, it is by no means the only one
possible. It is based upon a political decision sustained by the will of the legislator
which can be substituted or superseded by a different decision. Consequently, it is
constitutionally irrelevant whether the Investment Aid Act fits in with the existing
economic and social order and whether the means employed for guiding the economy
are congruent with a market system.
Id. at 279. While the case makes no mention of Lochner, the language of the opinion makes
it at least plausible to assume that the German justices had Lochner in mind, and that they
2005]
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understood as one of both Rechtstaat and Sozialstaat, of individual rights as
well as social responsibility. 3 In German constitutionalism, it seems to go
without saying that social legislation can redefine the very meaning of
economic freedoms. 14 The European Court of Justice (E.C.J.) builds upon
such jurisprudential milestones of the Bundesverfassungsgericht (German
Federal Constitutional Court) and of other states' constitutional courts. 15 In the
E.C.J.'s case law, private economic rights are to be enforced and protected up
to a point. Enjoyment of these rights may certainly be restricted by the
Brussels lawmakers in light of "objectives of general interest pursued by the
Community."'16 More generally, the E.C.J.'s attitude towards social causes is
dramatically more progressive than the Lochner Court's. Not surprisingly,
when the E.C.J. had a chance to decide a Lochner-like dispute, it forcefully
upheld the limitation of bakers' working hours imposed by a Dutch statute.
17
were consciously taking distance from Peckham's economic dogma, while adopting
Holmes' lucid dissent. On the links between German and American jurisprudence in the
first half of the twentieth century, see Ugo Mattei, Why the Wind Changed: Intellectual
Leadership in Western Law, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 195, 203-208 (1994) (discussing the "legal
transplants from civil law to the common law" and hypothesizing "that there is an inverse
relationship between leadership in Western law and the degree of positivism and localism of
a given legal culture").
"3 See Antinori, supra note 9, at 1788-96 (discussing with special regard to the social
function of property rights how Rechtstaat and Sozialstaat both "influenced German
constitutional tradition"). See also David P. Currie, Lochner Abroad: Substantive Due
Process and Equal Protection in the Federal Republic of Germany, 1989 Sup. CT. REv. 333,
343 ("[T]he social duties of property in Germany, like various public interests in this
country, justify limitations that go far beyond the simple case of preventing affirmative
harm to others.")
14 See Currie, supra note 13, at 371-72 ("The tendency of the German decisions has been
progressive rather than reactionary ... [u]nlike their American counterparts during the
Lochner years, the German judges do not seem often to have blocked desirable or even
fairly debatable reforms.").
"5 This is due to the fact that, to this day, the European Union does not have a fully
binding bill of rights of its own. To make up for this lacuna, and to guarantee member states
that the Community would nonetheless take fundamental rights seriously, the E.C.J. in 1979
explained: "In safeguarding [fundamental rights, the Court] is bound to draw inspiration
from constitutional traditions common to the Member States, so that measures which are
incompatible with the fundamental rights recognized by the constitutions of those states are
unacceptable in the Community." Case 44/79, Liselotte Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz,
1979 E.C.R. 3727, 3728 (E.C.J.). The Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, signed
by all the member states on October 29, 2004, is waiting for ratification. If it comes into
force, it will contain a binding "bill of rights" for the Union.
16 Case 44/79, Liselotte Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz, 1979 E.C.R. 3727, 3747
(E.C.J.).
17 Case 155/80, Criminal Proceedings Against Sergius Oebel, 1981 E.C.R. 1993 (E.C.J.).
As in Lochner, Sergius Oebel, a bakery owner, was prosecuted for violating a state
regulation, banning nighttime work in bakeries. Id. There was no equivalent of the
[Vol. 85:867
LOCHNER IN EUROPE
The social and economic policy implemented by the Netherlands was, in the
words of the court, "consistent with the objectives of public interest pursued by
the Treaty." 18
Against this background, Justice Peckham's formalist protection of
individual economic freedom may appear impossibly distant from the 'social'
core of current European constitutionalism, and therefore ultimately
uninteresting.
II. ESTABLISHING COMMON GROUND: LOCHNER AND FRANzIN
There is, however, a sense in which Lochner contains a wealth of valuable
insights for contemporary Europe, and prompts fundamental reflections on
core problems of EU law. Achieving this perspective requires the technical
step of replacing one dogma with another. Coarsely speaking, the role of
freedom of contract in Justice Peckham's worldview is played out on the
European stage by freedom of movement (for goods, people, and capital). The
mission of the E.C.J. in the past forty years has been to make sure that state
regulation - even regulation inspired by goals of social protection - would
pose as few constraints as possible upon inter-state trade. The parallel is still
quite rough, because the E.C.J. has never really espoused pure economic due
process as a guiding principle,' 9 and because the Luxembourg court has always
strived for a nuanced balance between trade interests and social protection.
Fourteenth Amendment in the Treaty of Rome. The Treaty, however, provided for the free
interstate movement of goods. See Treaty Establishing the European Economic
Community, Mar. 25, 1957, art. 30, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter Treaty of Rome].
According to Oebel, prohibiting nighttime activity made it impossible for bakers to have
baked goods ready by dawn and to deliver them beyond state borders in time for breakfast.
See Oebel, 1981 E.C.R. at 1996-97. Inter-state sales suffered a "quantitative restriction"
prohibited by the Treaty. The Court rejected Oebel's arguments and upheld the regulation.
Id. at 2020.
18 Oebel, 1981 E.C.R. at 2008 ("It cannot be disputed that the prohibition in the bread
and confectionery industry on working before 4 a.m. in itself constitutes a legitimate
element of economic and social policy, consistent with the objectives of public interest
pursued by the Treaty. Indeed, this prohibition is designed to improve working conditions in
a manifestly sensitive industry .... ). The Court's reasoning was not simply based on
Holmes's abstention from economic judgment. See Lochner, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905)
(Holmes, J., dissenting) ("[A] Constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic
theory, whether of paternalism and the organic relation of the citizen to the state or of
laissezfaire."). Nor was it based on Harlan's defense of states' legislative autonomy. See
id. at 69 ("Whether or not this be wise legislation it is not the province of the court to
inquire. Under our systems of government the courts are not concerned with the wisdom or
policy of legislation."). Although the E.C.J. might have confined itself to a de minimis
rationale, it, instead, went as far as to endorse a specific economic constitution. Cf Oebel,
1981 E.C.R. at 2010.
19 MIGUEL POIARES MADURO, WE, THE COURT: THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE & THE
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC CONSTITUTION 77 (1998) (observing that "there is not an 'economic
due process' approach to Article 30 or the European Economic Constitution").
2005]
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But if one bears for a moment with this simplification, Lochner-like paradigms
become evident on EU soil. The following story - chosen from among many
as a simple and convenient illustration - may show how and why.
Sweden has a worrisomely high rate of alcoholism. For this reason, a 1955
Swedish statute established a state monopoly over the distribution of alcohol
and subjected the import of foreign alcoholic products to a strict system of
licenses and controls. 20 Soon after Sweden's accession to the EU, the E.C.J.
reviewed this licensing system, and struck it down as unduly protectionist.
2
'
The court found that the state monopoly operated on non-discriminatory terms,
and that Sweden's overall restrictive policies (including a prohibition of
alcohol advertisements) applied to products of all origins. However, the
monopoly's license fees hindered the diffusion of foreign liquors and wine on
Swedish territory, and therefore reinforced the local habit of consuming
Swedish vodka rather than French cognac or Scotch whiskey. Sweden's
concern for public health could be addressed, according to the court, by less
restrictive, proportional measures.22
On its face, Franzen only struck down a most protectionist detail of a state's
trade regulation. However, the case triggered a chain of events that altered the
very core of alcohol policy in Sweden.23  De-regulatory lobbies were
tremendously empowered, and eventually managed to dismantle - again with
the help of the E.C.J. - the traditional Swedish ban on alcohol advertising.24
This story bears a number of analogies with Lochner. State legislation
enacted with the aim of protecting citizens from unhealthy practices was
weakened by a supreme court endowed with powers of judicial review, not in
the name of freedom of contract, but due to an equally basic faith in the
20 See PAULETTE KURZER, MARKETS AND MORAL REGULATION: CULTURAL CHANGE IN
THE EUROPEAN UNION 59 (2001).
21 Case C-189/95, Criminal Proceedings against Franz~n, 1997 E.C.R. 1-5909, 1-5974-77
(E.C.J.) (finding that Articles 30 and 36 of the Treaty of Rome "preclude domestic
provisions.., such as those laid down by Swedish legislation").
22 Id. at 1-5976-77 (finding that "the public health aim pursued... could not have been
attained by measures less restrictive of intra-Community trade").
23 See KURZER, supra note 20, at 86-87.
24 Case C-405/98, Konsumentombudsmannen v. Gourmet International Products
Aktiebolag, 2001-3 E.C.R. 1-1795, 1796 (E.C.J.) (holding that "unless it is apparent that...
the protection of public health against the harmful effects of alcohol can be ensured by
measures having less effect on intra-Community trade," an advertising prohibition is not
precluded by the Treaty of Rome). In this case, the E.C.J. left to the referring Swedish court
the ultimate decision on the proportionality of the advertising ban. In February 2003, the
Swedish Market Court eventually struck down the ban as disproportionate to the goal of
preventing alcohol abuse. See Konsumentombudsmannen v. Gourmet Int'l Product
Aktiebolag, Market Court [Sweden] (Feb. 2003); see also BrandEye AB, Shortcuts to
BrandNews: Cases in Issue 2/2003, at www.patenteye.se/pdf-filer/SC2BN-0203.pdf (last
accessed April 12, 2005) (discussing briefly the Swedish Market Court decision in
Konsumentombudsmannen v. Gourmet International Products Aktiebolag).
[Vol. 85:867
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Common Market. Like Lochner, the Franz~n decision aimed to define proper
federal boundaries, and set limits upon a state's police powers in the name of
economic freedom. Most notably, the E.C.J. demonstrated a deep belief,
shared by Peckham and Harlan, in the possibility of drawing clear lines
between police powers and individual rights, between state and federal
government, and between the private and the public sphere. The E.C.J. also
shared Peckham's faith in the possibility of drawing such lines by judicial
interpretation of a basic text (in Luxembourg, the EC Treaty). 25
This faith in impartial line-drawing by judicial fiat is as fundamental in
contemporary European legal discourse as it was for U.S. jurists in the Lochner
era. The E.C.J. could only become the powerful supranational institution that
it is today by pledging allegiance to the rule of law and to a close reading of
foundational Treaties.26 At the core of the Court's historical success lies its
ability to 'constitutionalize' the project of economic integration without ever
seeming to blur the line between law and politics, or between supranational
powers and states' sovereignty, or between common policies and individual
rights.27 To this end, the Court has developed multiple, sophisticated line-
drawing techniques (such as the test of proportionality, or the distinction
between products requirements and selling arrangements), and revised or
updated them as necessary to withstand doctrinal blurring and erosion.28
Yet, as Holmes might remark if situated in present-day Luxembourg, these
25 For a discussion of the formalism of the Lochner Court see DUNCAN KENNEDY, THE
RISE & FALL OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT 14, 18-20 (1998).
26 See J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403, 2413-17
(1991) (discussing the importance of the E.C.J. in the constitutionalization of the integration
process).
27 See MADURO, supra note 19, 20-21 ("What is remarkable in the Court's case law is
that the conflicts of values inherent in the exercise of discretion and the choices made
thereon are not made explicit, but remain hidden behind formal reasoning."). There may be
many explanations for the resilience of this judicial style, and yet one seems by far the most
powerful. The project of European integration is characterized at its foundations by the
need to come to terms with the Nazi experience. See generally DARKER LEGACIES OF LAW
IN EUROPE: THE SHADOW OF NATIONAL SOCIALISM AND FASCISM OVER EUROPE AND ITS
LEGAL TRADITIONS (Christian Joerges & Navraj Singh Ghaleigh eds., 2003). There is a
sense in which Nazism was the mirror image of Lochner. While Lochner (in its vulgarized
but current European version) was about the sacrifice of just social causes on the altar of
absolute individual freedoms, Nazism stemmed from the opposite move of treading upon
individual rights in the name of allegedly collective values. The challenge for European
jurists is to face this dark legacy, and to continue the practice of balancing individual rights
and social causes without ever slipping into sin again. See DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE
OF ADJUDICATION 73-74 (1997) (observing that the "stakes in general ideological conflict
have been higher" in Europe than in the U.S. because the centrists must defend "against a
communist left and a fascist or authoritarian right that have actually held and have
continuously threatened to take power").
28 See Daniela Caruso, Private Law and Public Stakes in European Integration: The
Case of Property, 10 EUR. L.J. 751, 764 (2004).
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lines remain self-effacing. The Franz~n saga, among many others, can attest to
this point. How serious is the plague of alcoholism in Sweden? Are import
controls or advertising bans a disproportionate state reaction to an otherwise
manageable social problem? Considering that EU legislators cannot really
regulate the field, is the de-regulatory impact of Europeanization a fatal blow
for Sweden's public health? 29 Or is it rather a welcome demise of old-time
paternalism? 30 Opinions on the subject abound. The Treaty of Rome, just like
the U.S. Constitution as read by Justice Holmes, provides no real answer. The
test of proportionality cannot produce one definite answer. The peaceful
coexistence of individual freedom (of trade) and social responsibility in
European constitutionalism - allegedly a major point of distance from Lochner
- breaks down into conflicting strategies of governance. 31 A united Europe
must deal with the fact that social policy has a variety of irreconcilable
meanings. 32 Franz~n opens a window on a rough ideological battlefield, on
which the Treaty casts long shadows and sheds no light. Against this
background, Lochner becomes worthy of close attention in EU circles, and so
do Keith Whittington's reflections.
29 EU-wide harmonization of measures regarding alcohol abuse is likely to remain
impracticable for a long time as "European laws or framework laws may also establish
incentive measures designed to protect and improve human health and to combat the major
cross-border health scourges, excluding any harmonisation of the laws and regulations of
the Member States." See SECRETARIAT OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION, DRAFT TREATY
ESTABLISHING A CONSTITUTION FOR EUROPE, art. 111-179 § 5 (2003), at
http://europa.eu.int/constitution/futururrlconstitution/index-en.htm (last accessed April 12,
2005).
3 Surveys of public opinion indicate a growing resistance towards invasive regulation of
alcohol consumption among certain categories of Swedish nationals. See KURZER, supra
note 20, at 90-91, 95.
31 With particular focus on the E.C.J.'s attitude towards states' provision of subsidized
public services, Christian Joerges has recently observed that the E.C.J. may be beginning to
move beyond the compelling language of doctrinal logic and to engage in a dialogue with
different national traditions. See Joerges, supra note 10, at 187-88.
32 Thomas Wilhelmsson, Varieties of Welfarism in European Contract Law, 10 EUR. L.J.
712, 715 (2004).
[The] inevitable tension in the welfare state concept itself... makes it possible to
deduce all types of contractual regimes-from extremely libertarian to extremely
interventionist-from this general concept. The tension referred to lies in the fact that
the welfare state, on the one hand, believes in market forces and private enterprise as
the instrument of creating the economic basis of welfare, and, on the other hand,
intervenes in the market forces in order to secure goals connected with redistribution
and social security. In other words, the welfare state is characterized by a continuous
balancing between market-oriented efficiency and solidarity-based interventions of the
state. The idea of the welfare state does not specify where and how these interventions
should be made.
[Vol. 85:867
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III. WHITTINGTON'S LESSONS
Whittington's contribution is an optimal vehicle for transatlantic dialogue in
matters of judicial politics. In Europe it is still hard to talk about the "politics"
of judicial review. Europeans - including the legal community - tend to
ignore the actual people who sit as justices in Luxembourg. It is a common
belief that their work is strictly informed by the rule of law, and that their
preferences should not and do not have any bearing on the ultimate outcome of
E.C.J. cases. Dissenting opinions do not exist, and decisions are seemingly
unanimous. 33 Against this background, Whittington's argument that a sort of
political calculus can inform the behavior of non-political judicial bodies
comes across as thought-provoking but not threatening.34 Whittington explains
that the Lochner court was, on one hand, "insulated from political pressure and
immersed in legal tradition.' '35 On the other hand, it displayed a penchant for
rational choice and carefully picked its battles. When it struck down federal
statutes, the U.S. Supreme Court often did so in such a way as to minimize its
own political costs; its timing and its choices were at least in part motivated by
political opportunism and strategies of institutional survival.3 6
The E.C.J. is "[t]ucked away in the fairyland Duchy of Luxembourg" 37 and
definitely "insulated from political pressure." 38 E.C.J. judges are not vetted by
the European Parliament. The Lochner Court's institutional connection with
Congress and the White House finds no parallel in Luxembourg.
Whittington's lesson applies nonetheless. No court operates in a political
vacuum, and judicial responsiveness to political demands is a matter of
necessity, not of choice. The E.C.J. is obviously an active participant in the
shaping of EU policies. 39 In order to strengthen the impact of its institutional
33 See Joseph H.H. Weiler, Epilogue: The Judicial Apr~s Nice, in THE EUROPEAN COURT
OF JUSTICE 215, 224-25, (Grdinne De Bfirca & Joseph H.H. Weiler eds., 2001). Weiler
explains that the E.C.J. has mostly adopted a cryptic, "Cartesian style, with its pretense of
logical reasoning and inevitability of results." Id. at 224. For a most nuanced analysis of the
E.C.J.'s judicial style, see MITCHEL DE S.-O.-L'E. LASSER, JUDICIAL DELIBERATIONS: A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL TRANSPARENCY AND LEGITIMACY 20 (2004) ("[T]he
E.C.J. depends on a conglomerate mode that pastes together facets of the institutional and
argumentative approaches.").
34 Keith Whittington more fully develops the analysis of the relationship between textual
interpretation and constitutional politics. See generally KEITH E. WHITTINGTON,
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING (1999);
KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL
INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (1999).
35 See Whittington, supra note 4, at 856.
36 See id. at 856-58 (discussing the court as a "strategic actor").
37 Eric Stein, Lawyers, Judges, and the Making of a Transnational Constitution, 75 Am.
J. Int'l L. 1, 1 (1981).
38 See Whittington, supra note 4, at 856.
39 For an updated survey of the interdisciplinary literature that explores the role of the
E.C.J. as a major player in the collective decision making process of the EU, see George
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role, the E.C.J. constantly struggles to preserve legitimacy and maximize
credibility. Furthermore, like the Lochner court, the E.C.J. may remain
"immersed in legal tradition," but it cannot avoid engaging in strategies of
political survival, or partaking of current ideologies.
Another insight in Whittington's contribution finds fertile ground in the EU
and is worthy of scholarly investigations. One cannot understand the
relationship between the Lochner court and Congress without considering that
"the legislator" of the Lochner era was a very composite entity. Whittington
demonstrates that, in taking a seemingly counter-majoritarian stance, the
Lochner court was simply responding to the wishes of a powerful constituency,
which, for contingent reasons, had been bypassed at the time in which the
statute was adopted.40
Applying these lines of inquiry to Europe, we find out that when the E.C.J.
struck down the above-mentioned Swedish measures, it did so because the
Swedish constituency was highly divided on alcohol policies, and because the
protective regulations no longer seemed to please several political forces.4 1
Without this part of the picture, we would necessarily fail to understand what
the E.C.J. is doing, and would be left with over-simplified, primitive readings
ofjudicial behavior.42
Finally, EU scholars may benefit from Whittington's many examples,
illustrating how the presence of a federal structure of government complicates
the dynamics of judicial review. The Lochner court may not have been
engaged in an active mission to strike down all sorts of social legislation.
Congress fared quite well before it, and its statutes, even if 'progressive,' were
rarely invalidated by the Supreme Court. This brings us to look beyond the
many constraints posed by the E.C.J. upon states' social measures, and to
highlight the Court's consistent support for the development of EU-wide social
policies in Brussels. Any evaluation of the E.C.J.'s agenda needs to take into
account how the Union's legislators fare before it - and their score is indeed
remarkable, even in matters of "progressive" legislation. 43  In 1998, for
Tridimas, A Political Economy Perspective of Judicial Review in the European Union:
Judicial Appointments Rule, Accessibility and Jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice,
18 EUR. J. OF L. & ECON. 99 (2004).
'o See Whittington, supra note 4, at 821-23.
41 See KURZER, supra note 20, at 95-96 (arguing that Europe's deregulatory pressure has
radically affected Swedish alcohol politics).
42 For the argument that the E.C.J. partakes in an active dialogue with a number of
different voices, not always coinciding with the official 'spiel' of states' legislators, see
Fernanda G. Nicola, Multilevel Alliances and Distributive Consequences in the
Harmonization of European Contract Law (paper presented at the conference Rethinking
Ideology & Strategy: Progressive Lawyering, Globalization and Markets, November 6-8,
2003, Northeastern University) (manuscript on file with the author).
43 See Case C-376/98, Federal Republic of Germany v. Council, 2000-10 E.C.R. 1-8419
(taking the exceptional action of annulling a Council Directive limiting the advertisement of
tobacco products).
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instance, the E.C.J. upheld the imposition of maximum working hours
throughout Europe, even though this required rather bold interpretive moves.
44
The E.C.J. may have no principled objection to public intervention in the
market, or to the "social function" of private rights. The same court, however,
may object very firmly to such forms of intervention when they are enacted by
individual states in a way that hinders cross-border trade.
45
IV. EUROPE'S CLUES
By now it should be clear that Professor Whittington's contribution passes
the test of translation with flying colors. It remains interesting even when
exported, with unavoidable over-simplifications, onto the legal landscape of
the European Union. The closing part of this comment is devoted to show, in
turn, that contemporary European jurisprudence may provide useful clues in
the context of legal inquiries concerning the Lochner era. In fact, by observing
recent EU developments, U.S. scholars may be better able to gauge the impact
of centralized judicial review upon states' patterns of policy making.
Supranational judicial review is relatively novel in the EU.46 The legal
landscape of social legislation in most modem European nation-states was
developed under the assumption that the legislator would be sovereign, or at
least subject only to the control of an internal - not supranational -
constitutional court. In this landscape, social policy thrived according to
states' budgets and/or according to the preferences of states' constituencies.
Both good and bad memories of those days are still very fresh in European
legal consciousness. It is only recently that the E.C.J. has begun to strike down
state measures of social dimension, and it has done so with a rather light touch.
4 See Case C-84/94, United Kingdom v. Council, 1996-11 E.C.R. 1-5755, 1-5756-57. By
adopting a broad reading of a Treaty article concerning the "health and safety" of workers,
the E.C.J. upheld for the most part "the working time directive" (Directive 93/104) setting
EU-wide limits on working hours in most economic sectors. See id.
45 See MADURO, supra note 19, at 77-78 (finding that the standard of review applied to
community legislation is more deferential to the Community legislator than the standard
applied to national legislation is to the national legislator).
46 While the general concept of judicial review boasts a long pedigree in Continental
history, the institution of a dedicated federal (or supranational) court in charge of upholding
the constitution (or a foundational Treaty), both in matters of individual rights and with
regard to the definition of state and federal powers, is a modem development. If one
disregards the interwar Austrian model, it is only in the 1950's that the
Bundesverfassungsgericht became the guardian of the basic law of the Federal Republic of
Germany. The supranational judicial review of the European Court of Justice only took off
in the 1960's. See Donald P. Kommers, The Basic Law: A Fifty Year Assessment, 53 SMU
L. Rev. 477, 481 (2000) (discussing the Bundesverfassungsgericht's role as the guardian of
the Basic Law); Theo Ohlinger, The Genesis of the Austrian Model of Constitutional Review
of Legislation, 16 RATIO JURiS 206, 207 (2003) (The origin of the "concentration of the
power or review in a single court... was the establishment of the Austrian Constitutional
Court in the Austrian Federal Constitution of 1920.")
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Now, scholars have started to notice that the few instances in which the E.C.J.
invalidates state legislation of a social character may produce ripple effects.
The size of social policies may remain the same, but their reach may be
seriously affected. 47 State legislators can become more cautious, and much
more responsive to deregulatory lobbies.48 This effect is hard to quantify, but
it is real, and noticeable. 49
In the U.S., the Supreme Court's practice of invalidating unconstitutional
state legislation dates back to 1816.50 The social movements of the late
nineteenth century, and the legislative enactments that responded to their
demands, were born in the shadow of judicial review. It is impossible to know
what kind of welfare legislation might have developed in a Lochner-free
landscape. Reverse engineering does not apply to judicial history, and
innumerable other reasons may explain why U.S. labor and social law took
their peculiar shape and flavor. But in light of recent European developments,
it is plausible to infer that States would have acted differently without Lochner,
and that for better or worse Lochner caused a shift in legislative patterns. 51
Professor Whittington's tables provide us with valuable information
concerning the many statutes that were enacted, and the few statutes that were
struck down.52  The very structure of those tables, however, makes it
impossible to take into account the statutory measures that were not even
considered by state or federal legislators in anticipation of Lochner-like
scrutiny. Figures cannot convey the fact that a non-quantifiable change in
social legislation may have resulted from Lochner. Whittington explores
extensively the argument that the Court was constrained by political
47 See Fritz W. Scharpf, The European Social Model: Coping with the Challenges of
Diversity, 40 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 645, 648-49 (2002) (discussing the constraints
European integration places upon states' welfare policies); cf Paul Pierson, Coping with
Permanent Austerity: Welfare State Restructuring in Affluent Democracies, in THE NEW
POLITICS OF THE WELFARE STATE 410-11 (Paul Pierson ed., 2001) (concluding that the most
serious constraints upon European welfare states stem from cost-containment necessities,
and that necessary recalibrations may even prompt extension of social provisions).
48 For an illustration of this phenomenon see KURZER, supra note 20, at 95-96.
49 For an economic model of the effect of judicial review on the size of EU and States'
policies see Tridimas, supra note 39, at 109-12 (analyzing "how the presence of judicial
review affects the size of the policy measures taken by the policy makers").
50 Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. 304 (1816) (overturning state court judgment
regarding land tenure laws in post-revolutionary Virginia).
51 See WILLIAM E. FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR
MOVEMENT 51-52 (1991). Forbath counters the opinion that judicial review in the early
20th century "had only the slightest stymieing effect on the progress of labor reform," and
instead highlights "the courts' cumulative effects upon the development of labor's political
vision and aspirations." Id. at 51-52 n.79. Forbath argues that "the general contours and
political implications" of Lochner era judicial review made clear that "[b]road, class-based
legislative initiatives would not pass constitutional muster." Id. at 52.
52 See Whittington, supra note 4, at 837-38.
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calculations and strategies in its pursuit of judicial review. By contrast, his
contribution pays less attention to the fact that both state and federal legislators
were in turn constrained by the prospect of Lochner-like holdings. When a
Court endowed with powers of judicial review sends messages as strong as
Lochner, it prompts a silent change in the quantity or quality of social
legislation. The change might be for better or for worse, and may be refractory
to measurements, but it is an important factor in the overall evaluation of the
Lochner era. It might perhaps be possible to make Whittington's contribution
even richer by considering such non-measurable data, or by wondering what
kind of story we would tell now, if Lochner had never been decided.
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